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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the discourse strategies employed by Nigel Farage in the European Parliament 
plenary and attempts to relate one of his speeches to a larger continuum of populist and Eurosceptic 
discourses. The former leader of the UK Independence Party (UKIP) gained notoriety as an outgoing 
spokesman for Brexit, the British exit from the European Union. As such, studying his argumentative 
strategies gives insight into what aspects construct his narrative concerning the British referendum and 
EU policies. This thesis also attempts to answer whom Farage directs his speech at in the plenary 
sitting, and whether his speech is a serious attempt at debate in the plenary or rather an attempt to show 
himself opposing the EU on its own turf. The analysis will employ Critical Discourse Analysis as its 
approach, and further, Discourse Historic Approach as the methodological base for the analysis.  
 
Abstrakti 
 
Tämä opinnäytetyö tutkii Nigel Faragen käyttämiä diskursiivisia strategioita Euroopan Parlamentin 
täysistunnossa, ja pyrkii yhdistämään yhden hänen puheistaan suurempaan populististen sekä 
Euroskeptisten diskurssien jatkumoon. Entisenä UK Independence Partyn (UKIP) johtajana Farage sai 
julkisuutta Brexitin, Britannian EU-eron, kannattajana. Siitä syystä hänen argumentoivien 
strategioidensa tutkiminen valaisee sitä, mitkä rakenteet luovat hänen narratiivinsa liittyen Ison-
Britannian EU-jäsenyyttä koskeneeseen kansanäänestykseen, sekä yleisesti EU:n rakentamaan 
politiikkaan. Tämä opinnäytetyö pyrkii myöskin vastaamaan kenelle Farage kohdistaa puheensa EP:n 
täysistunnossa, ja mikäli hänen puheensa todellinen tarkoitus on olla osa täysistunnon väittelyä, vaiko 
pelkkä pyrkimys saada näkyvyyttä itsellensä hänen vastustaessa Euroopan Unionia sen omalla 
kotikentällään. Opinnäytetyön analyysi käyttää CDA:ta (Critical Discourse Analysis) tieteellisenä 
lähestymistapana analyysille, sekä DHA:ta (Discouse Historical Approach) metodologisena pohjana 
analyysille. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Populism and Euroscepticism have been hot topics of research on political rhetoric in recent years, as 
the decision by the United Kingdom to leave the European Union unfolded as myriad texts in different 
discourse spaces either supporting or opposing Brexit. One of the leading lobbyists for a British exit 
from the EU was the UK Independence Party (UKIP), whose leader at the time of the Brexit 
referendum was Nigel Farage. As a leader of the party, Farage led UKIP to victory in the 2014 
European election, hailing the time for a party with an exclusively Eurosceptic agenda to gain 
measurable success in Britain. Euroscepticism has existed in the UK before UKIP, but the party 
managed to gain considerable support from the populace, as well as sufficient media visibility to push 
their agenda further than any political actor before them in the United Kingdom. How, then, does 
UKIP’s agenda materialize in discourse? This thesis attempts to find where the Eurosceptic agenda 
pushed by Nigel Farage fits relative to populist discourses, Eurosceptic discourses, and more 
specifically, Brexit discourses.  
 
Few previous research papers are concerned with what happens inside the European Parliament, and 
even the European Parliament elections are generally seen as second-order elections, as voters outside 
of a few outlier countries are not particularly interested in voting for European Parliament candidates. 
Still, the discourse that happens within the Parliament opens a window into the agenda of, if not parties, 
then party coalitions that exist inside the EP. Furthermore, debates in the European Parliament plenary 
sittings offer a space for political actors to voice their opinions on European Union policies in a mostly 
uninterrupted manner, which enables the study of whole speeches that are unaffected by other actors—
such as interviewers or panel members—while not being fully separated from the overall discourse 
surrounding the debate subject. It is worth exploring what kinds of discourse strategies Farage employs 
in a plenary setting, and analyzing the credibility of his claims as well as whom he targets his speech at, 
while speaking in the European Parliament. Besides finding out where Farage’s rhetoric in the plenary 
fits along the continuum of populist Eurosceptic discourses, this thesis asks the question: What 
discourse strategies does Farage employ in constructing his claims and his narrative? 
 
  
5 
 
2  Theoretical and Methodological Framework 
 
Firstly, it must be addressed that the term populism is often in overuse when discussing politics, 
especially when it is used in conjunction with certain politicians or political parties. Populism, in this 
thesis, refers to the act of promoting “the people” over “the elite” in either a party agenda or in 
connection with an electoral campaign, speeches, or when campaigning for a referendum as in the case 
of Brexit. As a term “the people” is a loose term, but most accurately implies a group of people who 
deem themselves to be the norm within their nation, and the term has nationalist connotations. In this 
thesis, specifically right-wing populism and discourses surrounding it are explored. In Mudde and 
Kaltwasser’s (2017) terms, no economic doctrines are the defining factors of populism, nor are any 
other defining features of its host ideologies. Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017) explain that the term was 
originally used in the late nineteenth century by movements that held peasantry as the main pillar of 
both economy and society. According to them, populist parties started using the term “the people” as a 
means to appeal to more than just the “working class”. For conceptual clarity, populism will be defined 
here by a means of classical categorization rather than radial categorization. Thus, populism here will 
refer to an ideology that is both “anti-elitist”, against a powerful minority, and for “the people”, a 
loosely connected group with certain shared qualities. As a term, “the people” can be seen as defined 
by the populist or the populist party themselves, in such way that best serves their own interests. 
Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017) also propose a certain dualism between “the people” and “the elite” 
(pure versus corrupt), and that populism is a form of moral politics rather than centered around class, 
power, or socio-cultural matters. Albertazzi and McDonnell (2007) state that voters who support 
populist parties do not always position themselves on the extreme right, and the clumping all populism 
together under a ‘radical right populist’ banner is detrimentally misleading. They also state that 
populism itself is compatible with left-wing ideologies as well, and thus referring to populism when 
talking about the extreme right for ease of comparison is misleading and distorts the term of populism 
itself.  
 
A Critical Discourse Analytical approach will be taken in this thesis, because as an attitude it gives a 
good lens to look through at political discourse. Fairclough (2013, p. 394) states that “What CDA can 
contribute is a linguistically and semiotically sophisticated but still socially framed understanding of 
the properties 
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of practices of public dialogue.” It is therefore a fitting perspective to conduct credible analysis on 
political speeches and news media contributions on political matters; as an approach it can fit inside 
methods to consider both the logical ways of interpreting speech or written acts as well as the social 
frameworks within which these texts are produced. Fairclough (2013, p. 394) explains that the three 
main contributions CDA can make are: 
 
(a) describing the dynamic structuring of social orders of discourse in ways which locate diverse 
discursive practices of the public sphere in relation to other discursive practices and to each other, and 
the tendencies of insulation and flow affecting those locations; (b) analysing particular discursive 
practices (actions) conjuncturally in terms of their selective interdiscursive articulation of practices 
(permanencies) from across social orders of discourse; (c) providing a framework for 'internal' analysis 
of any particular discursive practice which highlights properties germane to their functioning within 
the public sphere. 
 
Despite the possibility of CDA sounding like a method rather than an approach or an attitude, Van Dijk 
(2017) reminds that calling CDA a method is outright wrong, and instead it should explicitly be held as 
an attitude for research, and within its scope a multitude of methods may be used.  
 
The method of analysis in this thesis will be based on the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA). 
Reisigl and Wodak (2009) write that an important tool of the Discourse Historical Approach is 
triangulation. By triangulation, a wide range of empirical observations, as well as a multitude of 
theories, methods and background information are taken into account in the analysis. Triangulation is 
problem-centric, and the specific problem which is to be studied decides the focus of the observations, 
and dictates the use of background theory. As the research problem in this thesis is centered around 
political discourse within the European parliament and specifically right-wing populist discourses and 
Brexit discourses, appropriate theoretical framework and methods regarding the topic will be 
employed. Principally DHA can be divided into three: Firstly, the topic and contents need to be 
identified from the source material. Next, discursive strategies will be examined, and finally, the types 
of linguistic realizations relating to the context and setting will be studied. The historical, or diachronic 
context of the analyzed text may also be explored by finding its place in the larger scheme of the 
discourses it is pertaining to. Shortly, DHA can be employed without needing to unnecessarily restrict 
one’s analysis due to disciplinary borders (in this case between linguistics and political science, for 
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example). Due to this inherently interdisciplinary nature, the approach fits the analysis of political 
rhetoric, with its multiple possible viewpoints.  
Another theoretical factor that will be salient regarding this thesis is linguistic modality, specifically 
related to the modification of the illocutionary force of utterances. In the categorization of different 
modalities (e.g. epistemic, deontic, and dynamic modality), dynamic modality does not express the 
modification of illocutionary force, according to Šandová (2011). Therefore, only the epistemic and 
deontic modality of utterances in the analyzed text are taken into account. Šandová (2011) also writes 
that female political actors use modalities more frequently in their speech, which, in the case of this 
thesis means that explicit linguistic modality may be more difficult to find in the data, and contextual 
cues may be more useful than trying to find more explicit forms of modality, such as modal adverbs.  
 
Wodak, KhosraviNik and Mral (2013) pose an interesting question pertaining to the nature of populist 
discourses. Specifically, they ask about inclusion and exclusion in right-wing populist discourses, and 
who belongs to “the people”, who does not? The exclusion of, for example, certain minority groups 
from the whole of “the people” or regarding oneself as being a part of the majority that wants a change 
(without necessarily knowing what would change with a certain political party being in power) creates 
an interesting phenomenon in the sphere of populist discourse. They then state that “Populism is the 
consequence of an optimistic understanding of majority rule.” (Wodak, KhosraviNik & Mral, 2013, p. 
4) Would the political party bringing change become “the elite” themselves in the event of gaining 
power within a national parliament, or refrain from becoming what they have previously stood against? 
Do “the people” actually gain anything and is a hypothetical change in any way positive for the ones 
regarding themselves as the majority that wants a change, and does the underlying political system of a 
nation prevent any optimistic hopes for a noticeable change? Wodak (2015, p. 9) writes that “populists 
create a demos which exists above and beyond the divides and diversities of social class and religion, 
gender and generation”. A populist therefore effectively denies the existence of any other—natural—
divides between people in hopes of creating and sustaining an idea of a “quasi-natural border between 
‘us’ and ‘them’”. (Wodak, 2015, p. 9) This creates a way for less well-off people to see “the elite” as a 
scapegoat for all the negative aspects of their lives, and for those people to feel like something 
belonging to them has been taken away and with the power they are promised they may “reclaim” it 
and find themselves in a better situation. The media, specifically social media and news media also 
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play an ever-growing role in giving populism a place to manifest itself. Wodak (2015, p. 11) states that 
by populism in the media, “politics is reduced to a few slogans thought comprehensible to the public at 
large”, and that “the media have also contributed to the transformation of politics through more and 
continuous emphasis on frontstage performances’”. New media outlets understandably give ever more 
chances for regular citizens to take part in making politics a “reality show” by seeing only the 
aforementioned “frontstage performances” of politicians and constructing one’s opinions and ideas of 
right and wrong politics based on them. Nigel Farage, the former leader of the UK Independence Party 
(UKIP) suits this description of a person who makes “frontstage performances”, as is true also in the 
text analyzed in this thesis. 
 
Going further, the analysis of political rhetoric explicitly has historically been regarded as a side job for 
a political scientist or a linguist, and comprehensive theory and methodology for conducting 
interdisciplinary research on political rhetoric is relatively new. Reisigl (2008, p. 97) writes that 
rhetorical analysis can be summarised to mean the analysis of “the employment and effects of linguistic 
(including nonverbal) and other semiotic means of persuasion in rhetorical terms”. The correct 
terminology must be used while analysing political rhetoric lest it turn out amateurish and rudimentary. 
Reisigl (2008) explains the analyses of political rhetoric to be inherently problem-oriented, as the steps 
and measures taken to analyse political rhetoric depend on the research problem and interests of the 
researcher. As it is, this thesis is concerned with right-wing populist discourses, Brexit discourses, 
Euroscepticism, and how Nigel Farage’s speeches in the European Parliament plenary sittings fit into 
these discourses and the debate leading to the Brexit referendum as a whole.  
 
Taggart (1998, p. 364) already in 1998 wrote that “even in the most pro-European of countries, it is 
possible to see significant traces of Euroscepticism.” Euroscepticism was, therefore, not a new issue at 
the time when the United Kingdom’s referendum on their EU membership was confirmed. The 
Maastricht Treaty of 1992 did not pass without troubles, and the original signatories of the Treaty of 
Rome have also had their problems with Eurosceptic minor parties. Taggart (1998) also writes about 
three different ways that Euroscepticism manifests itself in political opinions. Euroscepticism can be 
about suspicion towards the ever-growing European integration, it can exist as a doubt that the EU 
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would be the best possible way of achieving European unity, because of overreaching inclusion; 
however, Euroscepticism can exist as an idea of exclusion by the union, in terms of the union having 
different interests than poorer countries or the working class. Daddow (2006) writes that the British 
form of Euroscepticism has its roots in the figurative shadow of Britain’s great past and in the way 
Britain and Europe are portrayed as being different from each other in literature. He also adds that 
“British public’s sense of its past is still being shaped by stories coming to them from educational and 
other historical material which happens to pertain to episodes in the development of the nation’s power 
prior to 1945.” (Daddow, 2006, p. 82) The UK seems to have its own unique kind of Euroscepticism, 
and Gifford (2015) continues with the same thought by explicating that a sort of “antithetical” 
otherness is a core part of the resentment towards the EU and its integration policies in Britain. The 
continent versus the United Kingdom therefore works as a dualistic view that Gifford believes is 
generally held by British Eurosceptics. British exceptionalism and uniqueness, as well as glorious war 
history and portrayals of impressive past leaders of the country are a defining part of the ethos of 
Britishness that may play a large role in the minds of Eurosceptics in the UK. Dorling and Tomlinson 
(2019) explain that past events are also rebranded or constructed into myths of glory in the literature 
about British past. They write that, for example, the Dutch invasion of Britain in 1688 has been since 
branded as the “glorious revolution” to downplay the fact that Britain got invaded; instead, it is taught 
that Britain has not been invaded since William the Conqueror did so in 1066. This exceptionalism and 
past glory create a suitable ground for resentment towards the rest of Europe and especially towards 
European integration via the European Union.  
 
The discourses of populism and Euroscepticism relate to Brexit discourses in being the “mother 
ideologies” feeding the discourse surrounding Brexit. Bale (2018) writes that a person trying to 
understand populist Euroscepticism must perceive the reciprocal nature of the relationship between 
more radical right and the centrist right. Essentially, UKIP as a (in Bale’s terms) radical right party has 
a symbiotic relationship with its moderate counterpart, the Conservative Party. Bale (2018) also states 
that UKIP was not the first party in the United Kingdom to embrace populistic Euroscepticism, but it 
filled a void left by the Conservative Party as they, for a time, abandoned such ideologies. 
Consequently, UKIP can be seen as having taken the initiative from the Conservative party at that 
point, and following the Euro crisis and the migrant crisis, UKIP gained an upper hand compared to the 
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Conservative party, and could force David Cameron (the then leader of the Conservative Party) to 
promise a referendum on the EU membership of the United Kingdom.  
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3 Description of the Research Material 
 
The research material in this thesis is a speech by Nigel Farage in a European Parliament plenary 
sitting during the 2 December 2015 sitting concerning the EU-Turkey summit that had happened in 29 
November 2015. The speech, as a text, fits into both the categories of populist discourses and Brexit 
discourses. The specific speech was chosen for analysis, as it was during a time when the UK 
referendum for continuing its EU membership or leaving was already confirmed for June 2016, and it 
was also an archetypal speech by Nigel Farage, in the sense that it contains his usual discourse tropes, 
and is pertaining to a plenary sitting where the conclusions of a EU-Turkey summit were debated—
which means that further integration with Turkey was on the table. Furthermore, the plenary sitting also 
coincided with the ongoing migrant crisis, which gave Eurosceptic politicians further fodder regarding 
their usual anti-immigrant sentiments, and integration with Turkey also happens to be a topic that 
rouses some politicians’ fears of further troubles with the Schengen area. Therefore, this speech works 
as a prime example of both populist and Brexit discourse. 
 
A speech in a European Parliament plenary setting from Farage was chosen because of the clarity, 
uninterruptedness, and appropriate length of the speech. Opposed to an interview setting with the 
interviewer inevitably guiding the progress of the conversation, clearer inferences can be made of 
Farage’s utterances in the case of a whole speech where he gets to construct his whole narrative in a 
single setting. It is also interesting to analyze and draw conclusions about whether Farage directs his 
speech at a plenary sitting towards only the crowd listening to him at the sitting, only to members of his 
own party coalition, or to a wider public that may or may not be interested in hearing/reading what he 
talks about in the European Parliament. Further, academic analyses of rhetoric within the European 
Parliament are scarce, and it brings another dimension into this thesis: how does a speech in the EP fit 
into the larger scheme of political rhetoric, and in this case, how does it fit into a continuum of 
Eurosceptic discourses, populist discourses and Brexit discourses. The whole speech that is being 
analyzed can be found in the appendix. 
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4 Analysis  
 
In this analysis, I will analyze an archetypal speech by Nigel Farage in a European Parliament plenary 
sitting. Some aspects of his speeches can be found and identified in every single speech he makes in the 
plenary sittings, and the one I have chosen for this analysis is from 2 December 2015. The topic of the 
plenary sitting that day was an EU-Turkey summit debate. This speech Nigel Farage held at the plenary 
sitting was at a time, when it was already known that the United Kingdom would hold a referendum on 
their EU membership the following year, the migrant crisis was the hot topic of the year, and the EU 
was about to give visa-free access to Turkish citizens.  
 
As an archetypal speech by Farage, common structural factors, common types of nominations and 
predications, as well as a strategic “stacking of a deck” of reasons for a Brexit at the end of his speech 
can be found from this particular address to the Parliament. Farage starts off with his usual addressing 
of the president of the European parliament, following up with his “issue list” of the day, this time 
consisting of bashing the currency that “has impoverished the Mediterranean”, saying that the 
Schengen area has turned into a “free movement of Kalashnikovs”, and claiming that Europe is turning 
into a “single state of Europe, which . . . the European peoples do not want”. He goes on by referring to 
Turkey demanding €3 billion to contain the flow of migrants into Europe and claiming there are no 
guarantees of this actually happening. Following is his criticism of the EU planning to give visa-free 
access for “75 million people, whose average GDP income is half that of the poorest EU Member 
State”. He quips that “the way we will stop illegal immigration is to make it all legal immigration”, and 
as an ending statement tells the Parliament that, the reason Britain should vote to leave the EU is the 
“folly of Turkey”, which he claims is “not only stupid: it is damned dangerous.” 
 
There is a lot to unpack in this speech by Nigel Farage, and it is best to divide the whole into smaller 
portions according to the different nominations and predications he lists, as well as by the topics—
namely the European project (and its failure), the immigration crisis, and the British referendum—that 
are linked to the issues Farage talks about. The historical contexts regarding populist and Brexit 
discourses are also important to explore. It is also worth, in the end, to discuss whether his speeches at 
the plenary sittings are directed at other Eurosceptics, and if so, how does Nigel Farage attempt to 
persuade those other Eurosceptics to act—and towards what ends? 
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4.1 Basis of the Analysis and Nomination Strategies 
 
The analysis will be based on a triangulatory approach by Wodak and Reisigl (2017, p. 93), which 
itself is based on a multi-faceted concept of context that takes into account four levels:  
 
1. the immediate, language or text-internal co-text and co-discourse 
2. the intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres and discourses 
3. the extralinguistic social variables and institutional frames of a specific ‘context of situation’ 
4. the broader sociopolitical and historical context, which discursive practices are embedded in and related to. 
 
The first step in the analysis is thus to explore the text-internal part, which includes the nomination and 
predication strategies Farage uses, as well as what kinds of arguments he makes, how he uses 
perspectivization (for example, us vs. them), and whether or not he uses mitigation or intensification 
strategies in his speech. The discursive strategies Farage uses are listed in Table 1, and the most salient 
strategies are analyzed in the following sections. 
 
 
Table 1 
 
Discursive Strategies of Nigel Farage in his 2 December 2015 speech at a plenary sitting  
 
Discursive 
Strategies 
Purpose 
Nomination 
strategies 
Discursive construction of social actors: 
 proper names:  
Chancellor Merkel 
 professional anthroponyms:  
the Commissioner, the British Prime Minister 
 deictics: 
I, we, you, they 
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 collectives: 
the European peoples, the Kurds, those 75 million 
 political entities: 
the European Union, Turkey, the single state of Europe, Britain 
 
Discursive construction of objects, phenomena, events: 
 concrete: 
the Mediterranean, Asia, Europe 
 abstract: 
policy failures, the idealised Schengen area, common asylum policy 
 
Discursive construction of processes and actions: 
 material: 
buying ISIS oil, free movement, illegal immigration, political 
integration 
 verbal: 
encouraging the aims of ISIS, persuading 
 figurative: 
taking the cork off a champagne bottle, turning a complete blind eye 
 
Predication 
strategies 
Characterization and qualification linked to the nominations: 
 currency (the Euro): has impoverished the Mediterranean 
 Schengen area: led to the free movement of Kalashnikovs 
 common asylum policy: the lowest ebb for policy yet 
 Turkey: blackmails the EU, keener on bombing the Kurds than ISIS, 
turns a blind eye to ISIS in their country, closely linked to buying ISIS 
oil 
 political integration (with Turkey): not only stupid, but dangerous 
Argumentation 
strategies 
Claims of truth or rightness expressed to further the speaker’s argument: 
 claims of truth: the Euro has impoverished the Mediterranean, the 
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Schengen area has led to free movement of terrorists, the EU is 
attempting to fast-track Turkey’s EU accession, the EU cannot stop the 
flow of immigrants 
 claims of rightness: it is right for Britain to leave EU because 
integration with Turkey is dangerous 
Perspectivization 
strategies 
Positioning speaker’s point of view and expressing involvement of distance: 
 us vs. them: the peoples of Europe against the European elite, the EU 
against Turkey 
Intensification 
and mitigation 
strategies 
Modal changes of the illocutionary force of utterances: 
 epistemic:  
o intensification: 
fallacy of equating all the EU institutions’ work to a process of 
creating a “single state of Europe”, fallacy of explaining the 
economic turmoil of southern Europe solely with the issue of 
currency 
o mitigation: 
backgrounding relevant information regarding the causes of 
economic troubles in countries of the Mediterranean 
 deontic: 
o intensification: 
claiming that Britain should leave the EU only on the basis of 
deeper Turkish integration into the union 
o mitigation: 
backgrounding reasons why Britain should vote to stay in the 
union 
 
 
The most salient social and political actors Farage nominates in his speech are I, we, you, they, the 
European peoples, Chancellor Merkel, and the Commissioner. I, of course, refers to Farage himself—a 
man who had a private school education, has a background in commodity trading, and who, at the time 
of the speech was the leader of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). We metonymically 
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refers to the EU, but might also refer to the addressees of Farage's speech, and you is a subgroup of we, 
referring to EU leaders, such as the Commission, as well as Angela Merkel, who are among the 
addressees of Farage's speech. He refers to Turkey as they, and implies that the European peoples are a 
cohesive, homogeneous unit. Chancellor Merkel is, of course, Angela Merkel, and the Commissioner 
he refers to is the then Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker. 
 
4.2 Predication Strategies 
 
Firstly, the predication strategies Farage uses for the deictic expressions in his speech are 
deconstructed. Farage refers to himself in a distancing manner, setting himself against the leaders of 
EU institutions in saying that he guesses what they are trying to do, and that he himself has seen a lot of 
policy failures during his time in the European parliament (implying that others have not regarded them 
as failures). Farage uses we as a metonymic nomination for the EU when he states that, in case Turkey 
joins as a full member state, the EU will end up bordering Syria, Iraq and Iran. Contextually, one can 
infer that bordering these three countries is dangerous in his opinion because of the political turmoil 
caused by both ISIS and other religious fundamentalist groups, as well as political instability and ethnic 
conflicts. He also uses we as a collective nomination for the addressees of his speech in implying that 
those addressees are also seeing what he is seeing (the attempt to create a single state of Europe). You 
in his speech refers to certain addressees of his speech, specifically Angela Merkel and Jean-Claude 
Juncker, who Farage implies as culprits of reckless political decision making. The you he speaks of is 
being blackmailed by Turkey into giving more money as a guarantee for stopping the excess flow of 
migrants through land routes (for which Farage also implies Turkey has, in reality, given no 
guarantees), and also thinks that making all illegal immigration legal solves the issue of the migrant 
crisis. The they he speaks of refers to Turkey, and the predications for they include blackmailing the 
EU leaders into giving money for guarantees of reducing immigrant flows, persuading the EU into 
giving visa-free access to Turkish citizens, letting ISIS roam through Turkey freely as well as buying 
ISIS oil.  
 
Secondly, the expression of the collective European peoples, the proper name Merkel and the 
professional anthroponym the Commissioner. Farage refers to the European peoples as a cohesive, 
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homogeneous unit with a shared will. He asserts the obviousness of the European peoples not wanting 
a single state of Europe. After this he mentions Angela Merkel as having figuratively opened a 
champagne cork that led to immigrants bursting from the Middle East into Europe, and that she, 
together with the EU institutions, cannot put the cork back in. The Commissioner in this case refers to 
Jean-Claude Juncker, and Farage implies that Turkey was an agent persuading the EU into giving their 
citizens visa-free access into EU regardless of what Juncker says. 
 
The predication strategies Farage uses put certain social and political actors into negative light, as he 
suggests that Angela Merkel and Jean-Claude Juncker have made poor political decisions and are 
unable to overturn those decisions. Farage also suggests that Turkey is an insidious agent in European 
politics, swindling the EU of its money without giving anything concrete in return, and that Turkey 
makes no effort to rid their country of ISIS. He claims that political integration with Turkey is "not 
only stupid, but dangerous", and that Turkey is keener on bombing the Kurds than ISIS. He even refers 
to a Pew institute poll about Turkish people's support for ISIS in order to make a point that 8 percent of 
the Turkish people actively encourage and support the aims of ISIS. The truth is that the Pew institute 
poll asked 947 Turkish people to rate their views on ISIS from very favorable to very unfavorable (or 
undecided), and 7 percent of respondents thought ISIS is somewhat favorable, and only 1 percent 
thought they were very favorable. The question was “Do you have a ___ opinion of the Islamic militant 
group in Iraq and Syria known as ISIS?” The Pew institute also notes that the margin of error for the 
global attitudes survey in Turkey for that year is 4.3 percentage points. (Poushter, 2015) Essentially, 
the predication strategies of Farage shine an unfavorable light on Angela Merkel, Jean-Claude Juncker 
and Turkey. 
 
4.3 Argumentation Strategies 
 
Next, the argumentation strategies employed by Nigel Farage in his speech. He makes five central 
claims in his speech, four of which can be described as claims of truth, and one as a claim of rightness. 
These five claims are all linked to two more general clichés of his, the topos of the "European project" 
(and its failures), and the topos of political integration (with Turkey in this instance). Farage claims that 
the Euro has impoverished the Mediterranean, that the Schengen area has led to the free movement of 
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terrorists, and that the EU cannot stop the flow of migrants—all three of these claims of truth are 
related to what Farage himself calls the failures of the European project. Firstly, the claim that the Euro 
has impoverished the Mediterranean will be compared to other research and figures. For example, in 
the case of Greece—perhaps the most talked about country in terms of the Euro crisis and the debt 
crisis in Europe—currency has not been the underlying issue behind its economic crises, but rather 
cronyism, funding reforms with excessive debt, and rampant corruption (Kalaitzidis & Zahariadis 
2015, para. 16-18). Although Kalaitzidis and Zahariadis (2015, para. 19) also explain that the European 
Commission was slow to recognize problems with the Greek economic administration structures, Euro 
as a currency was not one of the principal reasons for economic downfall in Greece. Secondly, about 
the claim that the Schengen area has led to free movement of Kalashnikovs (presumably meaning 
Islamist terrorists) within Europe. Graphs on Statista (2018) show that there were indeed 687 arrests 
made in 2015 for religiously inspired or Jihadist terrorism in the EU, a higher number than the two 
previous years combined. However, as the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris showed, perpetrators of such 
attacks can be born and raised in the country. Therefore, for example, the Islamic State did not have to 
physically infiltrate the EU, only manage to radicalize young Muslims already living in Europe. (Faiola 
& Witte, 2015) It is, then, questionable whether free movement within the Schengen area is a salient 
issue in the case of Jihadist terrorism. Thirdly, the claim that the EU cannot stop the flow of migrants 
into Europe. The built-in fallacy of the claim is the presumption that the EU would have tried to close 
its borders during the migrant crisis instead of trying to process incoming refugees according to the 
Geneva Convention on the protection of refugees, and further according to the Common European 
Asylum System. Farage does criticize the common asylum policy as well, for which reason his 
presupposition that the EU would have tried to prevent refugees from coming to Europe altogether is 
contradictory. It is written on the website of the European Commission that the EU has been working 
on creating the Common European Asylum System since 1999, so it was not a new concept in 2015. 
(European Commission, n.d.) Also, on European Council's site one can find the basis of the Dublin 
system, created to identify which EU member state is supposed to handle which asylum application. 
One of the crucial criteria it is based on is the first-country-of-entry criterion, by which a small number 
of member states on the fringes of the union are most likely to be responsible for the handling of 
asylum applications. (European Council, 2020) This is the exact system, which became a burden for 
some member states during the migrant crisis, and one of the reasons why some countries refused entry 
to all refugees while directing the flow of migrants elsewhere. The migrant crisis may have been 
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handled poorly, but Farage directs his criticism towards some actors, who during the crisis faced tough 
decisions regarding refugees in part because of others refusing to adhere to the ruleset of the EU.  
 
Next, Farage's claims about political integration with Turkey. His first claim pertaining to political 
integration with Turkey is the claim of truth that the EU is trying to fast-track Turkey's accession into 
the union. Starting with history, Turkey signed an association agreement with the European Economic 
Community (EEC) in 1964 and signed an application to join the EEC in 1987. Turkey was only 
accepted to be a candidate country in 1999, and membership negotiations with Turkey and the EU 
begun in 2005. Compared to the accession processes of other candidate countries, Turkey's has 
historically been the longest. In the European Commission's Turkey report of 2015 (published less than 
a month before Farage's 2 December 2015 speech at the plenary) it is mentioned that Turkey's 
accession process is halted by "key legislation in the area of the rule of law, freedom of expression and 
freedom of assembly that ran against European standards." (European Commission, 2015) Human 
rights issues (specifically regarding sexual and ethnic minorities) are also mentioned as important 
hurdles for Turkey to work over. Because of these reasons Turkey's EU accession had ceased moving 
forward already before 2015, but the EU was negotiating in its summit (to which the analyzed debate is 
linked) with Turkey to liberalize visa procedures between the two. As mentioned earlier in this 
analysis, Farage expresses concern over the support to terrorists by Turkish people, which, in turn, is an 
overgeneralized and fallacious interpretation of a Pew institute poll. The claim that EU is trying to fast-
track Turkey's accession into the EU is also fallacious, because of the aforementioned reasons that 
halted Turkey's accession negotiations—furthermore, giving visa-free access is not a part of the EU 
accession process, which means it does not affect the speed at which a candidate country can become a 
member state. Further, the second claim concerning political integration with Turkey, which is a claim 
of rightness about Britain leaving the EU, because integration with Turkey is dangerous. Farage 
mentions that, supposing there were no other reasons for Britain to leave the EU besides integration 
with Turkey, that would be reason enough. Without taking a position in a debate about Turkey's EU 
accession (which is a complex discourse topic itself), one can see how Farage takes his position in the 
debate by only referring to negative aspects of Turkey's accession. One of these is a hyperbolic 
statement about Turkey blackmailing the EU about stopping the flow of migrants for money, one is a 
questionable statement about Turkey preferring to bomb Kurds than ISIS, and one is a 
misinterpretation of statistics from a poll (which had a low participant count compared to the 
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population of Turkey). One could also mention the arbitrary nature of the continental border between 
Europe and Asia—which, essentially, form one big landmass of Eurasia—when Farage lists Turkey 
being 97 percent within Asia as a negative factor on top of other negative factors regarding its EU 
accession. Therefore, it is a hyperbole on top of other hyperboles when Farage states that Turkey's EU 
accession would—as a lone reason—be enough of a negative development in EU politics for Britain to 
secede from the union. 
 
 
4.4 Perspectivization and Intensification Strategies 
 
Finally, the perspectivization as well as intensification strategies of Farage’s speech will be explicated. 
His perspectivization strategies are common to a right-wing populist speaker, as he sets “the peoples of 
Europe” against “the European elite”, but he also pits the EU against Turkey. This perspectivization 
strategy both relies on a populist mythos of “the people” and “the elite”, along with narratively creating 
distance between them. Farage himself takes the side of “the people” in claiming that he knows what 
“the peoples of Europe” want. It becomes clear from Farage’s speech, and even outside this specific 
context it is known, that Farage wanted Britain to leave the EU. Additionally, it can be inferred from 
the analyzed debate speech that his intentions are likely also linked to arguing for the dissolving of the 
European Union by means of Eurosceptic parties lobbying for their respective countries’ secession 
from the union. Context-specifically, at the time of his 2 December speech at the European Parliament, 
Eurosceptic parties had recently gained more seats in the Parliament. Drew DeSilver, writing for the 
Pew Research Center, writes that following the 2014 European elections 221 MEPs were classified as 
being Eurosceptic. (DeSilver, 2019) This is presumably the audience Nigel Farage targets his claims of 
the EU at when speaking in the plenary sittings. Thus, my presupposition for the intentions regarding 
the illocutionary force of Farage’s claims on the EU creating a “single state of Europe”, Euro 
impoverishing the Mediterranean and Turkish integration being a sufficient reason alone for a Brexit is 
that he is—firstly—inciting Euroscepticism and—secondly—narrating justifications for a potential 
Brexit while backgrounding relevant information.  
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Farage’s statement “every single week and month we see the attempt to create a single state of Europe” 
is fallacious in equating all meetings of the European Parliament, European Commission and the 
Council of Ministers to a process of creating this “single state of Europe”. Talking about the “single 
state of Europe” may also be regarded as a way of avoiding the use of a more cliché populist term, the 
“European Superstate”, which is also a term Farage has employed previously and became known as a 
Thatcherism in 1988. (Margaret Thatcher Foundation, n.d.) Farage has himself denied that UKIP is a 
Thatcherite party, stating that “Thatcherism was of its time”. (BBC, 2014) Another claim by Farage can 
be regarded as both an epistemic intensification and a mitigation. When he claims that the Euro has 
“impoverished the Mediterranean” the contextual modality of the utterance holds that, firstly, it is 
known that the Mediterranean region of Europe is impoverished, and that the Euro as a currency has 
directly caused it. Secondly, the claim is backgrounding relevant information regarding the causes of 
economic troubles in countries of the Mediterranean (Farage may also be using “the Mediterranean” as 
a metonym for Greece) and thus acts as an epistemic mitigation as well. In this context, Farage’s claim 
that European integration with Turkey is a sufficient reason alone for Britain to leave the union may be 
regarded as deontic intensification. What makes the claim deontic in nature is that the speech as a 
whole builds Farage’s narrative of the European Union as an elite-driven institution that has, in his 
time, made bad policy decisions after another, culminating in the “folly of Turkey”, or Farage’s way of 
saying that the latest developments regarding Turkey’s integration with the EU are ridiculous, on top of 
already decades of detrimental policies. This way, Farage narrates a world, in which it is a British 
citizen’s duty to exercise their democratic right to vote, and vote leave for sake of “the people”.  
 
4.5 Diachronic Analysis 
 
Lastly, the analyzed text will be examined in a diachronic manner, to properly see its place on a 
timeline of populist discourses—and more specifically—Brexit-related discourses. Farage’s speech as a 
text can be seen as an extension of the previous Brexit discourse, but also as a part of a branch growing 
out of the larger whole of populist discourses. First of all, Nigel Farage’s party, UKIP, is itself a part of 
where his discourse stems from. Wodak categorizes UKIP to be a right-wing populist reactionary party. 
This means that UKIP supports a symbolic return back to a more traditional way of life, with Christian 
societal values. Farage, being the leader of the party at the time, very likely holds a political opinion 
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close to the one described. Wodak also explains that in populist discourse, it is maintained that “power” 
should belong to the will a supposedly homogeneous, arbitrarily constructed unit, “the people”. 
(Wodak, 2015) Further, democracy does not only exist for itself in the populist discourse, but—as 
Wodak explains it—metonymic nominations pertaining to political elites are used in populist discourse, 
“criticizing a dominant and inward-looking self-referentiality.” (Wodak, 2015, p. 53) Going further into 
Brexit discourses, Zappettini and Krzyżanowski (2019, p. 382) describe the discourse surrounding 
Brexit: 
 
In its contingent form, Brexit has been a process defined by political opportunism aimed at reigning in the 
infight over Europe inside the Conservative Party but, in turn, such process have been fuelled by long-
standing trajectories of British imperialism and Euroscepticism rooted in the historical visions of the 
relationship between Britain and the ‘continent’ and in the perceived distinct history of the British Empire 
and its democratic traditions from wider Europe. 
 
Such a view holds that Brexit discourses create an account of Britain as an isolated part of Europe, with 
its own distinct history and people, and with a glorious history as an empire that ruled over a quarter of 
the world. Zappettini and Krzyżanowski are not alone in viewing Brexit discourses as relating to a 
tradition of “rule Britannia” ideas. Dorling and Tomlinson (2019) write about how past education in the 
UK inevitably affects the picture older British folk have of their country. They write that, for example, 
geography was taught in a way that showcases the former British Empire, and that losing the former 
colonies was showed as being wistful events. In this sense, Brexit discourses inevitably focus on the 
conscious or subconscious desire of the British to rule themselves instead of working together with the 
rest of Europe. Furthermore, Kelsey (2017) writes about the “take back control” slogan of the leave 
campaign, and how it implied that by voting leave the British could take back control from an 
unelected EU elite, who impose arbitrary laws and regulations on the UK, and force them to take 
immigrants. All of these factors create a continuum of populist and Brexit discourses on which the 
analyzed text fits into.  
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5 Discussion  
 
The speech by Nigel Farage fits into the scheme of Eurosceptic, populist and Brexit discourses as a text 
that stands out as being constructed by a person, who—first of all—has gotten his education at a time 
when the former British Empire was still a more prominent topic in British schools, to whom political 
opportunism through crises works well to further his agenda, and who builds on the work of previous 
Eurosceptics. Furthermore, at the time of the speech he was the leader of UKIP, a party that may be 
categorized as being right-wing populist reactionary party, meaning that the party's agenda involves 
supporting a symbolic return back to a more traditional way of life with Christian moral values—and in 
UKIP's case, the main agenda of the party is to bring about a new "independence day" for Britain in the 
form of voting to leave the European Union. The speech fits into populist discourses, as one of the 
main nominations salient to the construction of the narrative by Farage is the "European peoples", 
which somewhat differs from the usual "the people" employed by categorically populist speakers. The 
"European people" Farage talks about is predicated to be a group that is against the creation of a "single 
state of Europe", which is Farage's way of avoiding the term "European superstate" that is 
characteristically a Thatcherism. Also, the fact that he explicitly mentions the "European peoples" 
instead of just "the people" signifies that Farage takes a position as a person who does not oppose 
Europe or Europeans, but is simply someone who does not condone to the general policy of European 
integration. In this sense, Farage can be seen as reinventing traditional populism and bringing in a topic 
of a "European unity of nation-states and lateral friendship", this all in a hypothetical future without the 
EU, of course. All of this, too, suits a man who can be characterized as a capitalist, who believes in 
nation-state democracy while supporting the exceptionalism of a country comprised of four nations—
Farage can be seen as creating a narrative that suits the politics of a country that fails to see the benefit 
of working with other European countries for the prosperity of all.  
 
Farage employs few explicit modal qualities in his utterances, and thus context-specific modality is a 
more important concept in analyzing what he says. Especially in the way he constructs an obligation 
for a sensible British person to vote leave in the upcoming referendum, one can find an argumentative 
strategy that—rather than involving linguistic explicitness to intensify the deontic status of his claim 
(such as must or have to)—instead involves Farage building his whole speech on the grounds of the 
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claim. Firstly, he lists events that he calls “policy failures”, such as fallaciously referring to the Euro as 
the sole cause for economic turmoil in the Mediterranean region, as well as claiming that the Schengen 
area causes terrorists to freely roam Europe. Afterwards, Farage targets certain influential European 
leaders in his speech in a way that can be characterized as epideictic blaming, when he explains how 
Angela Merkel is to blame for “opening a champagne cork” that let refugees burst into Europe, and 
later how Jean-Claude Juncker avoids admitting to Turkey persuading the EU into offering visa-free 
access for Turkish citizens. This is followed by the next fallacious claim: the EU is about to “fast-track 
Turkey to be an EU member state.” The claim cannot be true because of the inherent properties of how 
countries accede into the European Union; furthermore, Turkey’s EU accession process has been the 
longest yet of any country that has been accepted as a candidate country. Next, Farage wrongly 
interprets a Pew institute poll about Turkish opinions regarding ISIS. He asserts a strong claim that 8 
percent of Turkish people actively support ISIS, which stacks on top of previously existing reasons as 
to why European integration with Turkey is dangerous. He also ends his speech by stating that 
European integration with Turkey is “not only, stupid; it is damned dangerous.” One can conclude from 
these properties of the speech that Farage is doing a figurative “stacking the deck” of reasons for Brexit 
while backgrounding possible positive outcomes of Britain staying in the union and working with the 
other major European powers. Therefore, context-specifically, Farage stating that “the folly of Turkey” 
is alone a sufficient reason for a Brexit acts as a deontic intensification strategy. 
 
Who, then, is Farage directing his speech at? One can argue that the properties of the speech do not 
match an attempt at serious debate about European policies, since the speech is lopsided in terms of 
negative claims about the EU without offering any constructive value. Despite addressing the European 
Parliament President at the beginning of the speech, as well as referring to two other influential 
European political actors, he is seemingly only blaming the two, and only addresses the President as a 
form of courtesy. It can, therefore, be inferred that Farage either directs his speech towards leaders of 
EU institutions as mockery, or continues creating a narrative of himself as someone who stands up to 
“the elites” of the EU, to show that he speaks no differently within, opposed to without the European 
Parliament. 
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The scope of this research prevents exploring a larger amount of speeches by Farage in the European 
Parliament in the same fashion, as well as comparing his speeches at the plenary with domestic 
interviews he has given, as well as campaigning speeches. Further research into the subject could also 
explore the specific argumentation and intensification strategies employed by Farage and compare 
them to other prominent populist actors. Discourse within European Union institutions is overall hardly 
studied, as most research regarding political discourse in Europe concerns itself with different 
discourse genres in national settings—however, discourses within the EU may as well be worth 
researching.  
26 
 
6 Appendix 
 
EU-Turkey summit. Wednesday, 2 December 2015, Brussels. Nigel Farage’s speech: 
 
Mr President, I have seen quite a lot of policy failures in my long years here: the introduction of a 
currency that has impoverished the Mediterranean; I have seen the idealised Schengen area lead to the 
free movement of Kalashnikovs; and every single week and month we see the attempt to create a single 
state of Europe, which of course the European peoples do not want. But the EU’s common asylum 
policy is the lowest ebb for policy yet. Chancellor Merkel took the cork out of a champagne bottle and 
said anyone could come, and now you are trying to put the cork back in and realising it is not possible. 
So you have turned to somebody else to sort out your own problem. So let’s talk Turkey. 
They have taken your weakness, and they have now decided they are going to blackmail you. Not only 
do they want EUR 3 billion from you this year, they are going to want EUR 3 billion from you every 
single year. And in return they have given absolutely no guarantees whatsoever that they will stop 
people from coming, or indeed take people back. And they have managed to persuade you, whatever 
the Commissioner says, into offering them, by October next year, visa-free access for 75 million 
people, whose average GDP income is half that of the poorest EU Member State. 
I guess what you are doing is this: you are saying the way we will stop illegal immigration is to make it 
all legal immigration, and if that does not take the biscuit, now you are going to fast-track Turkey to be 
an EU Member State. So let us just think about that. A country, 97% of whose land mass is in Asia, 
apparently you want to join Europe. It is a country that appears to be keener on bombing the Kurds than 
it is on taking on ISIS. It is a country that has turned a complete blind eye to ISIS fighters travelling 
through its territory. It is a country where, according to the Pew institute in a poll last week, 8% of 
those 75 million actively encourage and support the aims of ISIS. It is a country directly and closely 
linked with buying ISIS oil, and we will finish up bordering Syria, Iraq and Iran. 
It is mad. It is the most dangerous decision the European Union has yet taken. I am sure the British 
Prime Minister will be delighted. He has campaigned for this since 2005. To me, without any of the 
other debates, if there was one single reason why Britain should in this referendum vote to leave the 
European Union, it is the folly of political integration with Turkey. It is not only stupid: it is damned 
dangerous. 
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